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The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, Second Edition:
What Has Changed Over the Past Decade, and What Lies Ahead?
Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte, and Matthew Spalding, PhD
Abstract: The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, first released in
2005, brought together more than 100 of the nation’s best legal experts
to provide line-by-line examination of each clause of the Constitution
and its contemporary meaning—the first such comprehensive commentary to appear in many decades. The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Fully Revised Second Edition takes into account a decade of
Supreme Court decisions and legal scholarship on such issues as gun
rights, religious freedom, campaign finance, civil rights, and health
care reform. The Founders’ guiding principles remain unchanged, yet
a number of Supreme Court decisions over the past decade remind us
that those principles still require constant and spirited defense. What
is needed today is a fusion of judicial originalism, scholarly originalism, and political originalism to advance the Founders’ vision for
our Constitution.
EDWIN MEESE III: We are looking at several things today.
First, in opening our deliberations this morning, I think we all
remember that this is the anniversary of 9/11, the attack on the
United States. Some of us are old enough to remember Pearl Harbor,
but we all remember 9/11. I think in our own way we will not let this
day go by without remembering the attack on the United States, but
more particularly the heroic actions of so many of our fellow citizens that day.
Since that time, I think all of us have been devoted to continuing
to make sure that we are doing what we can to preserve the United States, to preserve the freedoms that we have. Today, while the
battles are still continuing against those who literally are taking up

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/hl1260
The Heritage Foundation
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Washington, DC 20002
(202) 546-4400 | heritage.org
Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage
Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.
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The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, released in 2005,
was the first comprehensive
commentary on each clause of
the Constitution to appear in
many decades.
In the past 10 years, there
has been much new research
and thinking on the theory of
originalism, and the courts have
been paying more attention to
the Constitution as it was originally understood.
The second, fully revised edition
of the Guide addresses the latest
developments in constitutional law.
We have debated the Constitution from the very beginning; the
American Revolution in many
ways was a debate on and effort
of constitutional reform.
Today, Americans are once
again debating the Constitution:
discussing federalism, checks
on power, and other aspects
of our constitutional republic.
Now we need a fusion of judicial
originalism, scholarly originalism, and political originalism to
advance the Founders’ vision for
our Constitution.
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arms against the freedoms found throughout the
world, we continue to have those who are fighting
them in our thoughts and prayers.
In these proceedings today, we recognize two
beginnings. First is the launch of the second edition
of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution,1 but also it is
the first in our 2014 Preserve the Constitution series.
We started this as a way in which Heritage, and particularly the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, pays
attention to and talks about, and we hope provokes
thinking about, the Constitution of the United States.
William Gladstone, who was a former prime
minister of England, once said that it was the most
magnificent document ever drafted. He was talking
about this as a person who was the prime minister
of a country that had an unwritten constitution. Our
Constitution was the first of its kind to be written,
to have an actual contract between the citizens and
their government, and particularly to have a document which limited the power of government.
In most countries, you have a monarch or some
other principal person to whom its officers and its
military swear their allegiance. Our officials in this
country and our military swear allegiance to the
Constitution. We say that when we say the Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag. So the Constitution has a particularly important part in the lives of all of our citizens, and that is why we felt the necessity of reminding people and, particularly, seeking to have people
have greater understanding of what the Constitution is all about and what it actually provides.
In The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, you
find a most remarkable collection of scholarly work.
Over a hundred people have contributed to explaining what the Constitution says, what it means, how
it has been interpreted over the years, and how it is
important to people today. The Guide to the Constitution is now used by a number of our Members of Congress, and it’s a very hopeful sign that many of them
boast that they have it on their desk as a frequent
guide to their actions and what they do in representing the people in the legislative branch.
I wish that the same fidelity to the Constitution
carried forward into the executive branch. On occasion, the understanding that is contained in The
Heritage Guide would be very helpful to increase
the fidelity to that particular document. As a matter
1.

of fact, it should be useful also to those in the third
branch of government, the judicial system.
It is also useful to citizens themselves. There have
been a lot of books written about the Constitution,
but I would suggest to you that The Heritage Guide
to the Constitution is one that is particularly good in
terms of making our Constitution understandable
and readily available to everyone in the country to
use as a guide, to use as a means of understanding
the basic foundation—the written foundation—of
the way in which our government should be operated.
So much has happened over the course of the
last 10 years that we felt it necessary to have a new
edition of The Heritage Guide to the Constitution to
bring it up to date so it would be even more valuable
to all of you who are likely to use it. We hope that it
will continue to carry on what we at Heritage feel is
very important: the understanding of and allegiance
to the Constitution of the United States.
—Edwin Meese III is Ronald Reagan Distinguished
Fellow Emeritus at The Heritage Foundation and
Honorary Chairman of the Editorial Advisory Board
for The Heritage Guide to the Constitution.
DAVID FORTE: The first time we did this project, it took two and a half years, so when Matt Spalding called me and said we need a revision, I said, “No
problem.” That “no problem” took one and a half
years of full-time work because so much has happened in the last 10 years. From the beginning, Mr.
Meese was the George Washington of the project: He
was the one who inspired it, shepherded it through
Heritage, kept it on track, and to him we owe everything that has resulted.
Speaking of George Washington, there is a professor at Yale Law School, a brilliant man and iconoclastic fellow, Akhil Amar, and a few years ago he
was suggesting a new method of interpretation of the
Constitution: “What would George Washington do?”
It is not a bad question. In fact, The Heritage Guide to
the Constitution asks a slightly larger version of that
question: “What would the Founders think?”
nn

What would the Founders think of a President
who unilaterally changes the content of federal
law? See the entry on the “Take Care Clause” by
Sai Prakash.

David F. Forte and Matthew Spalding, eds., The Heritage Guide to the Constitution: Fully Revised Second Edition, Foreword by Edwin Meese III
(Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2014).
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What would the Founders think of a President
who engages military forces abroad without
needing to seek the formal approval of Congress?
See the entry on “Commander in Chief” by John
Yoo and Michael D. Ramsey.
What would the Founders think of a governmental agency that tells you what to do with your land
because there may be surface moisture on part of
it for part of the year? See the note on “Administrative Agencies” by Michael Uhlmann.
What would the Founders think of a President
who makes recess appointments while Congress
is only in temporary adjournment? See the entry
on “Recess Appointments” by Michael Carrier
and Michael Rappaport.
What would the Founders think of a Congress
that sends the President a bill containing thousands of new laws and regulations and spending
authorizations that effectively prevents the President from exercising his constitutional power of
veto? See the entry on the “Presentment Clause.”
What would the Founders think of a Supreme
Court that supplants the state’s police powers
with the Court’s own view of what, for example,
constitutes human life? See the entry on the “Due
Process Clause” by James Ely, Jr.

Perhaps more important, what would the Framers think of what has happened to the separation
of powers? That brilliant constitutional invention
was designed, on the one hand, to frustrate factions
and passions while, on the other, to enable cooperation for the common good. The result, the Framers
hoped, would be an effective government that still
protected the people’s liberties and security.

Elements of the Separation of Powers

As created by the Framers, as explained by The
Federalist Papers, and as practiced by the Founding
generation, the separation of powers has a number
of elements. Let’s look at these elements, and we
might be able to gauge just how well we have done
with those gifts that have been bequeathed to us by
the Founders.
First, having separate constituencies is an element of the separation of powers. The Constitution


required that each element of government be peopled by individuals who were chosen in a particular way to prevent a majority and a possibly tyrannical faction from gaining power. The people chose
the House of Representatives. The states chose the
Senate. A separately constituted College of Electors
chose the President. And the President and Senate
chose and approved a specially trained group of people to be the judiciary. Moreover, the double security
of our freedoms—as James Madison put it—was to
limit the range of power of the federal government as
a whole, leaving the enormous residue to the states.

Separation of powers was designed, on
the one hand, to frustrate factions and
passions while, on the other, to enable
cooperation for the common good. The
result, the Framers hoped, would be an
effective government that still protected
the people’s liberties and security.
What is the situation today of the element of separate constituencies? The Seventeenth Amendment
has removed the states from choosing Senators. The
College of Electors remains, but presidential elections have become more of a popularity contest, and
even appointments to the courts are now tinged with
political objectives.
The second element of the separation of powers is
partial agency. As James Madison explained in Federalist No. 47, partial agency means that one branch
of government is given a key role in the operations
of another branch. The President’s veto is part of
the legislative process. Through the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Congress sets and regulates much of
what happens in the executive and judicial branches. The President nominates members of the judiciary. The Senate must approve principal executive
appointments as well as treaties.
But for partial agency to work, something more
must happen. The branches must be willing to deal
with one another, to be agencies in one another. It
does not help if the President is not an agent in the
functioning of the legislative branch, if he simply is
absent, if he seeks to act unilaterally. It does not help
if the House and Senate do not speak to one another.
I’m not sure that this method of partial agency has
3
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much currency in the governance in Washington at
the present time.
Third, the political process keeps in check the
elements of government. What Madison called “the
republican principle”—an appeal to the people—
keeps selfish minorities from exercising power over
the majority. Thus, the people can change who are
to be Members of Congress or who is to be the President if they enact bad policy or exceed their powers.
But do political checks work today? Certainly,
elections continue to matter and to direct the country in one direction or another, but what kind of political checks do we have on the host of independent
agencies seemingly accountable to no one? What
kind of political check do we have on the Environmental Protection Agency or the Internal Revenue
Service? What kind of political check is there on a
President who no longer has to answer to the people?

What Madison called “the republican
principle”—an appeal to the people—
keeps selfish minorities from
exercising power over the majority.
Thus, the people can change who are
to be Members of Congress or who is
to be the President if they enact bad
policy or exceed their powers.
Fourth, there is the moral sense of self-restraint.
This is a significant element in the separation of
powers. Checking won’t do everything. That is what
Chief Justice John Marshall understood in Marbury
v. Madison (1803) when he eschewed any attempt
of the judiciary to involve itself in the political discretionary work of the executive branch, when he
interpreted Article III to allow Congress the widest
range of regulating the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. This principled manner of acting as
a self-restrained republican leader was exemplified
by George Washington.
Recall the restraint shown by Congress when it
considered limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court but chose not to do so on the argument that it might disable the courts from performing their separation of powers function. The judiciary restrains itself by a host of procedural rules, such
as standing, jurisdiction, ripeness, or the doctrine

of non-justiciability, when the courts refrain from
deciding an issue lest they intrude upon the appropriate functions of another branch. These are selfrestrained elements that a limited and republican
government imposes upon itself.
Fifth, the Constitution does allow for extraordinary actions when there is a crisis of someone or
some element exceeding his allotted power. Those
actions are impeachment and the amendment process. Both were intended to be very limited, and both
have been very limited. They are designed to be used
only in the most extreme kind of situation.
Sixth—and not many people think about this—is
non-compliance. There are times when one branch
so invades the core functioning of another branch
that the other branch will simply say that it will not
obey. Let me give you some examples.
Right after the Civil War, Congress attempted to
determine the outcome of a particular case before
the Supreme Court through legislation. In United
States v. Klein (1871), the Supreme Court said that
Congress cannot, under its allotted powers, prescribe a rule or decision of the Court: that is, tell the
Court how to decide a case. Rather, reaching a decision is what the courts do. In a more recent case, the
Supreme Court held that Congress could not reopen
a case that had already been decided by legislation.
Every President from Richard Nixon to the present has said that the War Powers Resolution constrains some of the essential commander-in-chief
power of the President. Recent Presidents stake out
their own exclusive powers in signing statements
when they declare that parts of acts of Congress
intrude into the exclusive powers of the presidency.

Unilateral Presidential Actions

This leads to the question of unilateral presidential actions, which may be justified non-compliance
or may exceed constitutional limits. What are the
powers of the President over acts of another branch
that he regards as unconstitutional? After all, he
takes an oath to support and defend the Constitution.
His primary method is to veto unconstitutional acts. The Constitution gives that to him directly.
In fact, George Washington did not believe that his
veto extended beyond unconstitutional acts. He
would not veto unpopular acts or those he thought
were bad policy. But because it is hard to draw the
line between the veto of an unconstitutional act
and an act of bad policy, we have accepted that it is
4
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perfectly proper for the President to veto acts he
regards as imprudent.
But what about non-compliance with the law
after it has been passed and signed but the President thinks it is unconstitutional? There the line is
not so clearly on the President’s side. If the President decides not to comply with a law because it
intrudes upon his essential constitutional powers,
that is one thing, but if he withholds enforcing a
validly passed law simply because he thinks it (or
a part of it) is unconstitutional, that is another situation altogether. Certainly, the Framers did not
want to lodge in the President a unilateral veto of
laws already passed.

If the President decides not to
comply with a law because it intrudes
upon his essential constitutional
powers, that is one thing, but if he
withholds enforcing a validly passed
law simply because he thinks it is
unconstitutional, that is another
situation altogether. The Framers did
not want to lodge in the President a
unilateral veto of laws already passed.
And certainly the separation of powers is not on
the President’s side when he decides not to comply
with acts that he thinks are bad policy, for under the
Faithful Execution of the Laws Clause, he is obliged
to follow and execute validly passed laws. What we
have seen lately are, for example, unilateral actions
outside of statutory authorization or the actual
changing of the text of the law.
Thus, we come back to the sense of moral selfrestraint as essential to the proper separation of
powers mechanism in our country. This is what the
Founders called public virtue. Why do we see so little of it today?
Professor Phillip Munoz of Notre Dame has given
us a clue. He notes that, as we all know, in 1938, the
Supreme Court left off the business of checking Congress. No longer would it enforce the limits of the
Commerce Power upon Congress, or the Spending
Power. To a large extent, the Supreme Court has also
left off limiting the President.


What has the Supreme Court done since then? It
has said, “Our job is to protect rights,” and what has
been the result? It has left Congress under no sense
of constraint, so Congress now can regulate under
the Commerce and Spending Powers, believing it
has no limit to what it can regulate.
The Supreme Court, as the exclusive guardian of
rights, thought of itself as the wise repository of what
rights are, and it went into the business of creating new rights that had been completely beyond the
ken of the Founding generation. And the President,
already given discretionary power by the Framers in
order to check what they had feared would be a more
powerful legislature, now moves far beyond what
the executive power is.
So what the result has been is that the Supreme
Court has left the field of checking—of being faithful
to the commands of the Constitution—and that the
branches no longer feel an obligation to check one
another. By not doing so, they are tempted to leave
off the greatest element of the separation of powers:
that of their own moral self-restraint.
Thus, what is needed most in this country is to
return to the original vision and experience of the
Founders as a renewed sense among our public leaders, among the politicians we elect, of public virtue
and respect of the individual rights of the people and
the limits of what government is entitled to do.
—David Forte is Professor of Law at ClevelandMarshall College of Law and Senior Editor of The
Heritage Guide to the Constitution.
MATTHEW SPALDING: This is actually a very
important occasion to look ahead not only to the
anniversary of the Constitution next week, but to
the publication of this volume. The first one was in
2005, so we are just under 10 years since that one
came out.
It is quite an amazing thing. I have to agree with
David’s comments. Ed Meese, whom I had the lifetime privilege of working for, saw the possibilities of
this book, this project from the very beginning—as
did Phil Truluck, I would add. They saw the possibilities. There was this great scholar and teacher out
there named David Forte, whom I got to work with,
and I was merely young enough and naïve enough
to think we could actually do it. And though it was
many years, we accomplished the feat.
I think it is a project that is going to be hard—
if ever—to replicate. We had this idea from the
5
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beginning that we would go clause by clause by
clause; we would not skip a one. As David will recall,
it was hard sometimes finding a scholar to write on
some of those obscure clauses, but 10 years later, we
have produced another volume.
Much has happened in the last 10 years, which
leads me to think we need a new originalism, or
at least a return to originalism. We have debated
the Constitution from the very beginning—indeed,
before the Constitution itself. The American Revolution in many ways was a debate and effort of constitutional reform: How do we take what we have
learned from British constitutionalism and the rule
of law and bring it to America in written form?

James Madison wrote that there
were two compacts to the American
Founding: the Declaration of
Independence, asserting the ends of
American government, equal rights,
consent of the governed for the
sake of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, and the Constitution,
which creates the institutions and
political array by which we express
our consent and govern ourselves.
James Madison wrote that there were two compacts to the American Founding. One was the Declaration of Independence, asserting the ends of
American government, equal rights, consent of the
governed for the sake of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness. The other was the Constitution: that
act of law-giving which orders our politics, secures
our rights, defines our nation; that constitutes us,
creates the institutions and political array by which
we express our consent and govern ourselves.
From the moment the Constitution was written, and during its writing, we debated it. One need
merely look to the debates of the Federalists and the
Anti-Federalists.
The first histories of the American Founding—
John Marshall’s, David Ramsey’s, Mercy Otis Warren’s—talk about the period of the Constitution, but
they have a problem: Madison’s notes weren’t available to them, so they skip over that. Joseph Story’s

three-volume Commentaries on the Constitution,
which we use in many cases as our guide, from 1833,
talks about the text of the Constitution but very little about the Convention.
This changed with the publication of Madison’s
notes in 1840. George Bancroft’s great History of the
United States looks at them extensively, opening up
more debate about what exactly was intended. The
first group to use those notes was the Abolitionists,
who used them to criticize the Constitution. The
debate over slavery was, of course, central to understanding the Constitution, an argument which I
would suggest was resolved when Lincoln properly
recalled the nation to the Founders’ Constitution.

The Rise of Progressivism

This all changed after the Civil War when the Progressives set out to create a movement to redefine
what the Constitutional Republic meant. This revolt
against formalism had various forms: theology, history, law, politics, and social policy. Scholars like James
Allan Smith and, most famously, Charles Beard argue
that the Constitution represented the triumph of
moneyed elites protecting their economic interests.
Progressive historians assert that democratic
forces of the American Revolution, having produced
an idealistic Declaration of Independence, were
later defeated by reactionary forces that produced
an anti-democratic Constitution. The Constitution’s
focus on restricting government power and moderating democratic opinion was viewed as misguided—
a serious barrier to extensive government necessary
for progress. The result was that the Constitution
must be made flexible, pliable, and “living.”
It turns out the judiciary would play a key role
in all of this. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
famously argued, “The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience”—a key factor in the
development and interpretation of the law based
on the consideration of the “felt necessities of the
time.” In this view, for outcome-oriented jurisprudence, later called legal realism, judging is not distinct from legislating, but merely a different form of
it, filling in the gaps, so to speak, created by general
laws. Judges determine not only what the Constitution says, but also certain questions about, in effect,
what policies will best harmonize with the document’s presumptions.
The response to the claims of Progressives came
in several forms. Historians like Robert Brown and
6
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Forrest McDonald argued against the economic
interpretation, and major academics attempted to
forge an alternative historical consensus emphasizing Lockean principles of classical liberalism and
republican consensus of Whig ideology. Over time,
these historical, scholarly debates turned attention
increasingly to a reconsideration of the Founders’
ideas and political thought; see the essays of Douglass Adair and Martin Diamond that rival the Federalist Papers.
Meanwhile, constitutional historians and practitioners argued against the Progressives. Scholars
of the time such as Edwin S. Corwin and Andrew
McLachlan defended traditional constitutionalism as a means to order and restrain government.
We think of jurists like William Howard Taft and
George Sutherland, the National Association for
Constitutional Government, and publications like
The Constitutional Review.
Then there were political figures. In many ways, I
would argue that the modern political conservative
movement began with the Republican Convention
of 1912, when several important figures, particularly
Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, took a stand in
the name of the Constitution against Theodore Roosevelt. They were followed by others, perhaps most
famously and most articulately by Calvin Coolidge.
The Progressive view came to maturity in the
New Deal, and the response to the New Deal and
the later Warren Supreme Court led eventually to
the revival of traditional constitutionalism of the
Founding, or what Attorney General Ed Meese in his
important speeches of 1985 and 1986 called “a jurisprudence of original intention.” The thrust of recovering constitutionalism against the Progressives was
very successful: He made it nationally prominent in
this debate. This changed how the Senate thought
about these questions and how the public looked at
the courts and led to great research and education of
judges, some of whom still sit on the Supreme Court.
Likewise, scholarship continued along its way,
recovering the thought and action of the American
Founding. The work of Adair and Diamond continues in the work of various students of political philosophy—the Claremont School, now followed by
many scholars at Hillsdale College.
The weakest point of this broad sense of originalism, and my point today, is that the weakness is not
in our politics. The New Deal weakened that part,
destroyed the base of constitutional originalism

in the political field. Conservatism in its early days
looked to many places for its sense of authority. Traditionalists looked to Burke and other European
thinkers, largely because they were convinced that
Progressive scholars were right about the Constitution. At the same time, there is a rising interest
in economic analysis, warning about a new road to
serfdom—all very good but not that constitutional
(or political, for that matter).

In many ways, the modern political
conservative movement began with
the Republican Convention of 1912,
when several important figures,
particularly Henry Cabot Lodge
and Elihu Root, took a stand in the
name of the Constitution against
Theodore Roosevelt.
Neither fully embraced the American Founding.
The fusion of conservatism was more a result of the
Cold War. The more recent popular turn of conservatism back to the Founders can be traced to Ronald
Reagan, again contributed to greatly by Ed Meese.

The Founders’ Constitutionalism
vs. the “Living Constitution”

But on this aspect of the originalist movement, I
think we need to do more work. I am struck reading
Ed Meese’s speeches again—looking at how much
he emphasized structure and form; the distinction
between the Constitution, as he says, and constitutional law. It is about court and branch construction.
The Supreme Court was not the only interpreter:
Each branch had a duty to interpret as it performed
its functions.
Unfortunately, originalism in the popular sense
of shaping politics has come to be associated with
the courts. It has been less consistently and rigorously applied to other departments, especially from
the point of view of those departments. It is now
time for an equivalent scholarship of that aspect,
originalism, and argument, and more work needs to
be done.
If there is anything we see in the pages of this
great book, it is a clear divide growing over time
between the Founders’ constitutionalism and the
7
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“living Constitution” given to us by the Progressives.
Although shaped by the courts, the regime created
by the Progressives, the very concept of it, is political and comprehensive. It is a new administrative
order, a bureaucratic order, a new form of governing
that threatens to overwhelm us, threatens self-government, and threatens to take away our consent.

The courts cannot restore the
Constitution by themselves.
This is partially a question of
institutional capacity, but also
the natural arguments of judicial
restraint and politics, especially
constitutional politics.
The courts cannot restore the Constitution by
themselves. This is partially a question of institutional capacity, but also the natural arguments of
judicial restraint and politics, especially constitutional politics—arguments that bring in the popular opinion needed to reconstruct a constitutional government.
The rise of the Tea Party has been one of the most
important aspects of recent political history, especially since the publication of our first edition of The
Heritage Guide to the Constitution. That is our opportunity: The Progressive project, it seems, has not yet
been settled; it is up for debate. Here they are, all of
these Americans turning back to the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Their instincts
are good: They talk less about rights and the Bill of
Rights and more about structure. They want to talk
about federalism, checks on power—all for the good,
but it needs to grow more, to mature and deepen.
I do not think we have sufficiently articulated the
constitutional arguments needed right now in politics. I fear sometimes we are overly technical and
legalistic—judicial, if you will. We object to what the
President’s doing. While we can make a good technical argument about whether we should do this or not,
“Let’s sue him” does not strike me as a good constitutional political argument of how the House of Representatives should deal with the President by going to
a third branch to ask permission.
There is an important distinction between what
Jim Ceasar calls legalistic constitutionalism—rules

decide cases, definitive answers enforced by courts—
and political constitutionalism, what I call constitutional politics, that emphasizes political actors
who are making political decisions in the political
realm in light of the Constitution. They both must
work together.
We need a new fusionism in the conservative
movement between judicial originalism—scholarly
originalism, if you will—and political originalism.
Each has a contribution, but they are unique in what
they do. There are important legal questions, but
the most important issues in our politics right now
require prudence: that is, political prudence, not just
jurisprudence. Legalistic constitutionalism is necessary but insufficient for the task.
What would this look like? Very briefly, it would
emphasize distinctions of principle—say between
constitutional government and the rule of bureaucrats, equal rights for all, special privileges for none.
It would talk about the purposes of government. It
would emphasize the constitutionalism of individual branches, the separation of powers as David talked about, federalism, checks on power, an aspect of
constitutional interpretation.
If the judiciary does not have the sole claim on
interpretation, “the final say” as Ed Meese likes to
say, the legislative branch and the executive also
interpret the Constitution through what is called
construction. We need to think more about constitutional construction, more scholarship on that,
more writing about it, the application of meaning in
particular circumstances.
nn

nn

nn

How do you amend something in a way that
makes it more constitutional, recognizing it still
has a constitutional problem?
How do you deal with things like entitlements?
How do you drive a wedge between the administrative state, which we really object to, and other
things we can possibly accommodate?

The legislative branch does not have to follow
the precedence of the courts: They have to build
consensus, move political opinions, and create governing coalitions. And the legislature and executive, the popular branches, can rally the people as
Reagan did, which gave rise to modern originalism
in the first place. These decisions are less definitive,
8
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often temporary, less technical, and partial, but politics looks for results over the long term. They are
directional, and that is how you reform the lines of
the debate.
In the end, having originalism in the court room,
it seems to me, is necessary and important but
insufficient for the task of constitutional revival.
We need something more dynamic, about checks
and balances, robust federalism, political figures
making the case, arguing, and deliberating—perhaps even making compromises—to preserve the
Constitution. That is the Madisonian solution, I
would argue.


The work to be done recovering the Constitution
is to be done by statesmen in the end, in the realm of
politics, in ordinary policy, and issues that go beyond
what the courts can do. It strikes me that this is the
original originalism—Ed Meese’s originalism—consistent with the original intention of the Framers,
and it is time to pursue that. Pursuing originalism
is a larger project to which this book and all of our
work contribute.
—Matthew Spalding, PhD, is Associate Vice
President and Dean of Educational Programs
at Hillsdale College and Executive Editor of The
Heritage Guide to the Constitution.
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